Renewed CISA support comes too late for midterm prep, some election officials say

Election officials said Wednesday that renewed federal cybersecurity assistance comes too late for some of their midterm preparations, following cuts they say disrupted support from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, though they are not closing the door on federal help. 

Michael Moore, chief information security officer for the Arizona secretary of state’s office, said the state recently reconnected with CISA’s regional leadership and plans to accept its support on Election Day if cyberattacks disrupt election services.

“We haven’t had a cybersecurity advisor in Arizona since March 2025,” Moore said at a briefing hosted by the Partnership for Large Election Jurisdictions, or PLEJ.

“When it comes to the services that they’ve recently offered, it is much too late,” he said. “We cannot utilize some of the services that they offer.”

CISA released an election security plan last week that assigns its 10 regional directors an election adviser role and describes a free threat-sharing platform connecting election officials, state intelligence hubs and federal partners. Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said the plan would be implemented in full.

The document does not specify how many employees will carry out the work or announce restoration of dedicated election adviser positions. It also does not explain how its commitments fit with a White House fiscal 2027 proposal to eliminate dedicated election security funding.

Moore described Arizona’s partnership with CISA during the 2024 election as “truly amazing,” contrasting it with the loss of staff and support that followed in 2025. Still, he argued that federal assistance remains essential when a foreign adversary targets election infrastructure.

“If there were a visible crossing of the Arizona border by a foreign adversary, we would expect federal response, not just the Arizona National Guard,” he said. “And why should cybersecurity be any different?”

Dean Logan, Los Angeles County’s registrar-recorder and county clerk, said larger election jurisdictions have spent the past several years building cyberdefenses and monitoring systems to help fill gaps in outside support. He cautioned that small and medium-sized jurisdictions may lack those resources and depend more heavily on threat notifications.

Election offices have also been conducting exercises and simulations to prepare for disruptions, with backup arrangements intended to keep voting available should a particular location or service become unavailable, he added.

But the problem extends beyond restoring services and can trickle into state-federal relationships, said Aaron Blacksberg, federal policy counsel at the Institute for Responsive Government, which works with election administrators.

“You can’t flip a switch and turn back on trust,” he said. “When resources diminish overnight, there’s a level of trust that diminishes as well.”

Others emphasized that federal relationships have continued despite CISA’s reductions. Eric Fey, St. Louis County’s Democratic director of elections, said his office never stopped communicating with the U.S. attorney’s office or the local FBI election crime coordinator.

CISA “was gutted,” Fey said, but his office remains willing to work with the agency where it can provide assistance.

“At a minimum, we’re going to engage with them and have that communication,” he said. “And if we can collaborate, we’re going to do that.”

Preparations can cover a broad array of cyber and physical threats that have the potential to disrupt election operations. They may range from internet outages affecting electronic poll books used for voter check-in to service disruptions targeting polling place locators and election reporting sites. 

An array of fear and disinformation tactics has also been top-of-mind for officials. Moore identified bomb threats as a concern following the 2024 election. Such threats can be sent remotely, are difficult to attribute and can halt work by forcing election personnel to evacuate.

“As directed by Secretary Mullin, CISA is implementing the newly updated and released election infrastructure security plan outlining available no‑cost voluntary services — including threat information sharing, technical expertise, vulnerability scanning, and other risk‑mitigation support,” an agency spokesperson said when asked for comment on the officials’ remarks. “CISA is committed to supporting state and local election officials to protect election infrastructure and safeguard our democracy.”

The administration’s CISA cuts reflect both a broader Trump-era push to shrink federal spending and lingering political grievances over its election security work. Conservatives have long accused CISA of enabling government censorship through its efforts to combat online disinformation in and around the 2020 election cycle. Former officials and experts have warned the reductions could weaken protections for voting systems and other critical infrastructure against foreign cyberattacks.